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SOME PARTICULAR AND SOME GENERAL
REFLECTIONS ON TRUSTEE CONTRACTS
By Richard C. Nolan∗
Introduction
This paper begins by looking at a well known problem that arises when
trustees make a contract in their capacity as such. It is a problem that
becomes particularly acute when trusts are used as the juridical struc-
ture for a business, which, by its very nature, involves contracting. The
proposed solution to this problem is, however, certainly not the final
conclusion of the paper. It is, rather, an example of much broader,
and vitally important, themes. It illustrates the legal, and hence the
economic, significance of solutions generated by lawyers in private,
transactional practice. That, in turn, has several broader implications:
practical, doctrinal, theoretical and educational.
The Problem with Trustee Contracts
Trusts are used as vehicles for business but are not entirely comfortable
as such.1 Key problems that have attracted considerable attention are the
difficulties in contracting “with” a trust.2 The reality, in systems such as
the common law of Singapore or England, is that there is no contracting
with a trust, just contracting with people who happen to be trustees.3 Or,
to put the point in the language of recent American scholarship, there is
no separate “trust” pool of assets that the trustees bond to a contract.4
This generates two well known and significant problems. The first is
that the trustees—the managers, rather than the owners, of the business
conducted by a trust—are personally liable on such a contract. The sec-
ond is that creditors of the trustees cannot easily reach the trust assets
to satisfy their claims against the trustees: the creditors must enforce
∗ Fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge; Reader in Corporate & Trust Law, Univer-
sity of Cambridge; Barrister and Door Tenant, Erskine Chambers, Lincoln’s Inn,
London.
1 Hayton, “Trading Trusts”, in Glasson ed., The International Trust (Bristol: Jordans,
2002), chapter 8 at 481.
2 See, generally, Ford & Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Law
Book Company, 1996 and updates), chapter 14, and Tjio, “Lending to a Trust”
(2005) 19 Trust Law International 75.
3 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Smith [2006] EWHC 1290 (Ch.) at [55], per David Don-
aldson Q.C. sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. This point is, nevertheless, a
matter of case law and may be affected by statute in particular circumstances: see,
e.g., Business Trusts Act (Cap. 31A, 2005 Rev. Ed. Sing.), ss. 24-25.
4 See Hansmann & Kraakman, “The Essential Role of Organizational Law” (2000)
110 Yale L.J. 387, esp. at 393-395.
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their rights against the trustees’ own, beneficially owned, assets, and the
trustees may then in turn look to the trust assets by way of indemnity.5
Of course, there are glosses on this law. The trustees can, by suitably
clear (and usually express) stipulation, limit their own liability on a con-
tract they make for the benefit of their trust. The trustees’ creditors can
sometimes claim to be subrogated to the trustees’ rights of indemnity;
but the trustees (and hence the creditors) can easily lose such rights of
indemnity, because the right essentially extends to re-imbursement of the
net sum due to the trustees, a sum which will necessarily be diminished
by any liability of the trustees to restore the trust fund in consequence
of their breach of trust.6 In addition, the trustees can, if they have suit-
able powers, grant security over the trust assets. But these glosses skirt
round, rather than address head on, the basic unavailability of trust assets
to creditors of the trustees where the creditors’ claims were generated in
the course of the trustees’ administration of the trust.
The first problem is easily dismissed. While an individual may not
wish to incur liabilities as a trustee which are nevertheless binding on him
or her personally, the easy availability of incorporation in contemporary
legal systems means that it is simple to create a corporate trustee, which
holds only its own minimum capital and the trust assets, so protecting
any individual from personal liability as trustee. That solves the trustees’
problems, though it compounds the problems of the trustees’ creditors,
who essentially are now dealing with a “trustee of straw”: a trustee which
has no free assets against which the creditor can enforce its claims, but
only the trust assets, which remain fairly inaccessible to the creditor
for the reasons noted a moment ago. This situation has brought forth
various legislative responses in jurisdictions where trading trusts are often
found.7 Alternatively, as already noted, the trustees can by contract limit
their own personal liability, where doing so is a practical possibility.
These solutions to the first problem, while helpful to the trustee (or to
the controllers of a corporate trustee), generate corresponding difficulties
for the trustee’s creditors: they reduce the practical utility and value of the
creditor’s claims against the trustee and consequently make any recourse
the creditor may have against the trust assets so much more important.
Essentially, therefore, these solutions to the first problem highlight, and
focus the debate on, the second problem: the difficulty of bonding trust
assets to a contract: that is, the difficulty a creditor has in reaching trust
assets to satisfy any claim the creditor may have against a trustee of the
5 See the works cited at note 2, supra.
6 Ibid.
7 See, e.g., Business Trusts Act, supra, note 3, s. 11, and Corporations Act 2001
(Cth.), s. 197, as interpreted in Hanel v. O’Neill (2004) 48 A.C.S.R. 378, O’Neill
v. Hanel [2007] S.A.S.C. 58.
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assets where the claim was generated in the course of administering the
trust.
This second problem is essentially about the enforcement of claims,
not the formation of obligations. That is, after all, what “bonding” assets
to the performance of an unsecured obligation is actually about: putting
unsecured creditors in a position where they can enforce their claims
against a pool of assets.8 A trustee can contract readily, subject only
to normal rules concerning the capacity of persons to make contracts
and the validity of any contract purportedly made. What is difficult for
the counterparty to any such contract—the creditor—is the subsequent
enforcement of that claim, should enforcement become necessary. And
naturally, since the value of personal claims is necessarily related to the
ease of their enforcement, any problems relating to the enforcement of
claims will affect their incidence, value and utility before enforcement.
This paper, therefore, focuses on the problems relating to the enforce-
ment of claims against trustees—the problems in the law relating to the
execution of judgments against trustees—rather than issues such as the
trustees’ rights of indemnity against trust assets or, occasionally, against
beneficiaries personally.9 It seeks to understand those problems in order
to suggest methods through which they might be resolved.
Enforcement of Obligations by Fieri Facias:
Defining the Problems
Perhaps the most obvious mechanism of enforcing a judgment is through
a writ of fieri facias: a writ entitling a state official to seize and sell
sufficient of the judgment debtor’s property to satisfy the judgment debt,
and any interest on it, and the costs of enforcement.10 The problems
that surround a writ of fieri facias against trustees are exemplified by
Jennings v. Mather.11
In that case, a trustee under a creditors’ deed was empowered by the
deed to carry on a business for the benefit of the creditors. In doing
so, the trustee incurred debts for which he was personally liable: he
had incurred the relevant debts, and the fact that he had done so in
his capacity as trustee did not affect his personal liability in respect of
them. Judgment was obtained against him for one of these debts, and
8 See, generally, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.
9 As to these problems, see, generally, the works cited at note 2, supra, and D.J.
Hayton et al., Underhill & Hayton—The Law of Trusts and Trustees, 17th ed.
(London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007) §83.
10 See, generally, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., volume 17(1) (London:
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002, re-issue) §§152-194.
11 [1901] 1 K.B. 108, aff’d [1902] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A.).
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goods which were assets of the business were taken in execution of that
judgment. The trustee then became bankrupt, and the goods were claimed
by his trustee in bankruptcy. The case was then tried as an interpleader
issue, to ascertain who had the better claim to the assets—the trustee’s
trustee in bankruptcy, or the execution creditor.
The Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the Divisional Court,
held for the trustee in bankruptcy. Its reasons were as follows. The
bankrupt trustee was entitled to an indemnity out of the trust estate against
liabilities incurred by him in carrying out the trusts, and so had a prima
facie right to a lien on the goods in question, which passed to his trustee
in bankruptcy. Consequently, the claimant (the trustee in bankruptcy)
was entitled to the goods as against the execution creditor, who had no
right to have goods held by the debtor as trustee taken in execution. As
Collins M.R. put it12:
“As such trustee he had, in dealing with the trust estate, incurred personal
liabilities, among which was the debt due to the execution creditor. Having
incurred these debts as a trustee in dealing with the trust estate, he would
have a right as against the trust estate to indemnity in respect of the personal
liabilities so incurred by him. That right would of course be accompanied
by a collateral obligation to make good to the estate any amount which he
might wrongfully have withdrawn from it, or to which he might be in default
in his dealings with it. Goods which formed part of the trust estate under
the deed clearly were not liable to be taken in execution upon a judgment
for a debt due from him personally. The execution creditor, Jennings, having
obtained judgment against Mather for a debt due from him, was only entitled
to have taken in execution on that judgment goods of which Mather was the
beneficial owner, and not goods which, like those in question, were only his
subject to a trust.”
There are plenty of other cases in which the same, or similar, points
are made or assumed, some of them concerning the administration of
estates.13
From such statements, the problem appears to be that creditors sim-
ply cannot have direct recourse to trust assets by means of fieri facias,
because the trustee, against whom execution is ordered, does not own
the assets beneficially. In fact, that is an overstatement of the problem.
Older authority is rather more subtle. It provides the foundation of
cases such as Jennings v. Mather; but it shows that what is in issue is not
12 [1902] 1 K.B. 1 at 5.
13 See, e.g., Haselinton v. Gill (1788, 1790, 1817) 3 T.R. 620, 100 E.R. 766; Caillaud
v. Estwick (1817) 2 Anst. 381, 145 E.R. 909; Duncan v. Cashin (1875) L.R. 10 Eq.
554; Wright v. Redgrave (1879) 11 Ch.D. 24; In re Morgan (1881) 28 Ch.D. 93; In
re Evans (1887) 34 Ch.D. 597; In re Gorton (1889) 40 Ch.D. 536. Note also Dowse
v. Gorton [1891] A.C. 190.
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a blunt mandatory rule, forbidding outright any execution on trust assets,
but rather a rule of priority. That may seem a small distinction. In fact it
is crucial. Mandatory rules are just that: it is impossible to contract round
them directly, though the ingenuity of lawyers is such that it is often, but
not always possible, to devise structures that achieve a result identical, or
very similar, to the result ostensibly prohibited by the mandatory rule.14
Rules of priority, by contrast, are generally default rules, around which
it is quite possible to contract.15 And therein lies a potential solution to
the problem of execution against trust assets.
The old case of Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea16 clearly establishes
that the rules about taking trust assets in execution of a judgment against
trustees are essentially rules of priority. To cut a long story short, the Earl
of Winchelsea agreed for value to settle freehold lands, but died before
executing the anticipated settlement. The intended beneficiaries of that
settlement brought an action in Chancery to have the Earl’s agreement
performed, but judgment creditors of the Earl claimed to be entitled to
execute their judgment on the land in priority to the beneficiaries. In the
event, the judgment creditors won.
Though the land was impressed with a trust for the beneficiaries by
virtue of the agreement, the agreement was not for adequate considera-
tion, and so it did not entitle the beneficiaries to priority over a perfectly
good claim at law for recourse to the land. The words of Lord Chancellor
Cowper make it quite plain that the issue was one of priority17:
“Articles made for a valuable consideration, and the money paid, will, in
equity, bind the estate and prevail against any judgment creditor, mesne
betwixt the articles and the conveyance; but this must be, where the consid-
eration paid is somewhat adequate to the thing purchased; for if the money
paid is but a small sum, in respect of the value of the land, this shall not
prevail over a mesne judgment creditor.”
One problem with the case, however, is that it is no where stated
precisely how the creditors’ judgment would be enforced: it was simply
accepted that the plaintiff judgment creditors had a legal lien on the
land.18 And in 1715, any judgment would have been executed against
14 See infra, text to note 61.
15 See, generally, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity: Doctrines & Remedies, 4th
ed. (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002), chapter 8.
16 (1715) 1 P. Wms. 277; 24 E.R. 387.
17 (1715) 1 P. Wms. 277 at 282; 24 E.R. 387 at 389; emphasis in the original.
18 (1715) 1 P. Wms. 277 at 278 (in argument for the beneficiaries) and 282 (per Lord
Chancellor Cowper), 24 E.R. 387 at 388, 389. Other notes of the litigation provide
no further relevant information: see 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 257-258 and 460-461, 22 E.R.
218 and 392.
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the land through a writ of elegit,19 rather than a writ of fieri facias, as a
writ of fieri facias would not issue against a freehold.20
Still, the case is important for present purposes. The case concerned
the proprietary effect of a judgment and its priority. A writ of fieri facias
similarly has proprietary effect: while general property in the goods upon
which a sheriff executes the writ remains with the judgment debtor, and
no property vests in the judgment creditor, a special property does vest
in the sheriff.21 This means that the debtor may not lawfully sell the
goods, and any unlawful sale of the goods by the debtor only conveys
title to them subject to the sheriff’s rights to reclaim them. Any contest
between a sheriff who has seized goods in execution from trustees and the
beneficiaries of those goods is, therefore, a question of priority between
two or more competing proprietary interests in the goods, as was the case
in Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea.22 The crucial point for present purposes
therefore stands: the rules governing whether trust assets may be taken
in execution of a judgment against trustees in their capacity as such are
essentially rules of priority.
None of this is to say or suggest that the cases which put trust assets
beyond the reach of the trustee’s judgment creditors are wrong, even
where the judgment debt was incurred in the course of duly administering
the trust. It is simply to say that they were truly about priority contests.
In those cases, the rules of priority were such as to defer the judgment
creditor’s ability to execute its judgment debt on assets legally owned by
a person to the rights of those with equitable entitlements in those same
assets. But that fact opens up various possibilities.
19 A writ of elegit created a conditional legal estate for security and satisfaction of
debts. It allowed the judgment creditor, the tenant by elegit, to hold and enjoy one
half of the judgment debtor’s legal estates until the judgment debt was satisfied. See
Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 2, at 161.
20 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, (supra, note 10), §§131, 154-155. More than a
century after Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea (1715) 1 P. Wms. 277; 24 E.R. 387, a
judgment was given further proprietary effect as a charge over the judgment debtor’s
land by section 13 of the Judgments Act 1838. Later, section 4 of the Judgments Act
1864 gave a tenant by elegit the right to seek an order for sale of the land through
a summary process. Judgements continued to operate as a charge on the judgment
debtor’s land, but only when registered, under the Land Charges Act 1900. This law
was consolidated into section 195 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and section 59
of the Land Registration Act 1925. Under the Administration of Justice Act 1956,
s. 35 charging orders replaced these mechanisms for enforcing judgments against
land. See, generally, Irani Finance Ltd. v. Singh [1971] Ch. 59 at 76-79, per Cross
L.J., and the Charging Orders Act 1979.
21 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, (supra, note 10), §166 and the cases cited there.
22 (1715) 1 P. Wms. 277; 24 E.R. 387. Indeed, even today, Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea
is cited as authority for the effect of a writ of fieri facias on trust assets: Halsbury’s
Laws of England, (supra, note 10), §163.
11-04-2008 FA
“Richard” — 2008/4/11 — 17:00 — page 253 — #9








Some Particular and Some General Reflections on Trustee Contracts 253
Enforcement of Obligations by Fieri Facias:
Routes to a Possible Solution
The priority of rights under a trust as against others who gain subsequent
rights in the trust assets can be manipulated by a number of techniques.
These are addressed elsewhere in more detail,23 but a short review is
useful here, before going on to see how they might be used to allow an
execution creditor of trustees to gain priority over beneficiaries for whom
the trustees hold.
Overreaching is the most common means by which the effects of
proprietary rights under a trust are limited.24 Overreaching allows a pur-
chaser of a trust asset, or a purchaser of an interest in the asset, to take
free of the beneficiaries’ rights in the trust asset. In essence, the trustees
are empowered to dispose of trust assets to purchasers free of the ben-
eficiaries’ interests in those assets; and in return, the trustees hold any
proceeds of the assets for the beneficiaries, unless the terms of the trust
provide otherwise.25 When trustees lawfully use one of their powers to
dispose of a trust asset to a purchaser,26 the purchaser will acquire a
derivative title to the asset, or a derivative interest in it, from the trustees,
unless statute provides to the contrary.27 The trustees had some title to
the asset and could accordingly pass that title to the purchaser, or confer
some interest on the purchaser granted out of their title. So long as the
trustees acted lawfully within their powers, the beneficiaries can have
23 Nolan, “Understanding the Limits of Equitable Property” (2006) 1 Journal of Equity
18 at 20-28.
24 See Harpum, “Overreaching, Trustees’ Powers and the Reform of the 1925 Legisla-
tion” (1990) Cambridge L.J. 277 (hereafter, ‘Harpum, “Overreaching” ’). See also
Fox, “Overreaching”, chapter 4 in Birks and Pretto, eds., Breach of Trust (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2002).
25 A beneficiary’s right to assets lawfully acquired by trustees in substitution for other
assets always depends on the terms of the relevant trust: the beneficiary would
not have such a right if the trust instrument provided to that effect, which very
occasionally it might. For example, if a trust provided that realty should be held
for X, personalty for Y, and the trustees exercised a power conferred on them to
sell land and turn it into money, then Y, not X, would take an interest in what had
become personalty: Rich v. Whitfield (1866) L.R. 2 Eq. 583. See also Vaizey on
Settlements, volume 1 (London: H. Sweet & Sons, 1887), at 424, but note Settled
Land Act 1925, s. 75(5). Overreaching does not necessarily generate proceeds,
though it usually does: Harpum, “Overreaching” (supra, note 24), at 282, approved
by the Court of Appeal in State Bank of India v. Sood [1997] Ch. 276 at 281 per
Peter Gibson L.J.
26 The qualification “lawfully” indicates that the trustees must respect any implicit
limitation on their explicit power: for example, they must not use it in bad faith
or for an improper purpose (see, e.g., Klug v. Klug [1918] 2 Ch. 67; Tempest v.
Lord Camoys (1882) 21 Ch.D. 571) or on the basis of irrelevant or inadequate
considerations (see, e.g., Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch. 25 and Sieff v. Fox [2005]
EWHC 1312 (Ch), [2005] 3 All E.R. 693).
27 See, e.g., Settled Land Act 1925, s. 18.
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no complaint about this. The beneficiaries’ rights against their trustees
are subject to, and limited by, the trustees’ powers, so the beneficiaries
simply do not have sufficient title to sue the trustees if the trustees act
within their powers. Furthermore, where the trustees dispose of a trust
asset without any breach of trust, the beneficiaries have no grounds for
any claim against the purchaser either, so he or she can enjoy a deriva-
tive interest in the asset free from the beneficiaries’ equitable interests
or claims. The trustees do not dispose of the beneficiaries’ rights, nor do
they infringe the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. The trustees deal
with their property in an asset, and the beneficiaries’ property or other
interest in that asset is simply so limited ab initio that it does not affect
the purchaser from the trustees in those circumstances.28
Overreaching can be extended beyond the core case described above.
From a purchaser’s perspective, overreaching turns crucially on two
things: first, the ability of the trustees as owner of an asset to trans-
fer their title to the asset in question, or to grant an interest out of that
title; and, secondly, the immunity from claims by the beneficiaries which
the purchaser enjoys by virtue of the terms of the trust. So long as those
two conditions obtain, the purchaser will gain clean title to the asset,
whether or not the trustees are liable for breach of trust in respect of the
disposition to the purchaser, unless there is some reason to impose a trust
(or other burden) de novo on the purchaser.29 In these circumstances, the
purchaser’s immunity from the beneficiaries’ claims will be wider than
the trustees’ immunity (if any).30
A useful example, dating from the nineteenth century, concerns
trustees’ powers to mortgage trust estates. Under the law as it then stood,
if trustees mortgaged trust estates unnecessarily, that could amount to a
breach of the trust.31 That breach could affect the mortgagees and mean
28 Note that sometimes a purchaser will be affected by the beneficiaries’ rights because
other distinct principles apply to the facts. For example, if Trustees A and B sell
an asset to Trustee B within the terms of the trustees’ administrative powers, that
sale is valid at law (Law of Property Act 1925, s. 72(4)) and the purchaser (B)
consequently ceases to be a trustee of the asset, but the sale to him or her is voidable
at the instance of the beneficiaries because Trustee B has engaged in self-dealing:
Campbell v. Walker (1800) 5 Ves. Jun. 678; 31 E.R. 801; Guinness plc v. Saunders
[1990] 2 A.C. 663 at 697-698, per Lord Goff; Shalson v. Russo [2003] EWHC 1637
(Ch.), [2005] Ch. 281.
29 For examples of such situations, see Neste Oy v. Lloyds Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 658 and Re Japan Leasing (Europe) plc [1999] B.P.I.R. 911, though the rea-
soning of those cases has recently been called into doubt by Shalson v. Russo [2003]
EWHC 1637 (Ch.), [2005] Ch. 218.
30 See also Nolan, “Property in a Fund” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 108 at 115.
31 The problem arose where lands had to be mortgaged in order to raise portions—
cash—for certain beneficiaries: Vaizey on Settlements, supra note 25, volume 2, at
1131.
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that they took their mortgage subject to, rather than free from, the inter-
ests of beneficiaries under the trust. Settlements sought to avoid these
problems by exonerating mortgagees from enquiry. For example, fol-
lowing a power for trustees to mortgage the trust estates, it was often
provided that:
“no mortgagee shall be obliged to inquire into the necessity, propriety, or
occasion of any mortgage being made by the said trustees or trustee for the
time being, by virtue of the power hereinbefore contained”.32
The effect of this clause was to ensure that the mortgagee took good
title to the mortgaged estates even if the mortgage granted pursuant to the
power were unnecessary, and even though grant of the mortgage would
still amount to a breach of duty by the trustees. In more modern language,
the mortgage served to overreach the beneficiaries’ interests under the
trust, notwithstanding the defect in granting the mortgage, because the
grant was authorised and lawful from the perspective of the mortgagee.
Similar clauses are still used in settlements today.33
Of perhaps even greater interest for present purposes is the fact that a
trust instrument can provide that an interest arising under the trust will
not endure (or will not have priority) in certain circumstances. So, for
example, a trust deed can provide that:
“Where the Trustees are authorised or required to pay or apply any capital
money or income to or for the benefit of any person who does not have the
capacity to give a valid receipt for it the Trustees may pay the same to any
parent or guardian of such person for the benefit of such person without
seeing to the application of it or themselves apply the same for the benefit
of such person as may be directed in writing by such parent or guardian and
the receipt of such parent or guardian shall be a sufficient discharge to the
Trustees”.34
Thus, should the trustees pay the minor’s parents in good faith,35 the
trustees’obligations are discharged, and the minor cannot sue the trustees,
32 Vaizey, A Collection of Precedents and Forms, (London: H. Sweet & Sons, 1888)
at 74.
33 See, e.g., Lord Millett, et al., The Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, volume
40(1), 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001), form 169. Note also Law of Property
Act 1925, s. 27(1).
34 The Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, ibid., note 33, volume 40(2), form
327, clause 27.1.
35 The limitation of the clause’s effect to payments in good faith would surely be
implied: neither trustees nor anyone else should expect exoneration from bad faith,
as it would be contrary to public policy and likely repugnant to the very nature
of a trust. See, generally, Hayton, “The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship”,
chapter 3 in Oakley, ed., Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford: OUP, 1996).
See also Armitage v. Nurse [1998] Ch. 241.
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or anyone else, on the grounds that the trustees misapplied the funds,
whatever happened after the payment to his or her parents. Of course,
the minor may have independent and distinct claims against his or her
parents (and possibly others) in respect of any breach by the parents of
their obligations in respect of the assets they received.
All this is easily explained. So long as trust assets are properly paid or
transferred in accordance with the relevant provision of the trust instru-
ment, the recipients of trust assets and their successors in title to the
assets are immune from any claims by beneficiaries arising out of the
trust: the beneficiaries’ equitable property rights simply do not extend
to affect such people. In principle, there is nothing odd about this. The
trust instrument, as given effect by rules of equity, is constitutive of the
beneficiaries’claims, and if the instrument does not give them any claims
in the circumstances, then that is an end of the matter.
Enforcement of Obligations by Fieri Facias:
A Possible Solution
The immediate point of examining these techniques is that they could
be employed to create a solution to the problem highlighted in Jennings
v. Mather,36 as properly characterised in the light of Finch v. Earl of
Winchelsea.37 The rights of beneficiaries under a trust could simply be
subordinated by the terms of that trust to anyone taking property in execu-
tion of a debt incurred by the trustees in due (or ostensible) administration
of the trust.38
In other words, the trust instrument could provide that an interest
arising under the trust will not endure (or will not have priority) as against
creditors executing on the trust property in defined circumstances. So,
for example, the trust instrument could state something along the lines
that:
“No person taking possession of, or title to, or an interest in, any part or parts
of the Trust Fund [as defined] through or as a result of the enforcement of
a judgment against the Trustees shall be affected by the trusts powers and
interests arising under or pursuant to this instrument over the Trust Fund (or
any part or parts of it) provided the judgment in question is in respect of (a) an
obligation [lawfully or ostensibly] undertaken by the Trustees in the course
36 Supra, note 11.
37 Supra, note 16.
38 Whether or not the fund is available to meet obligations in due execution, or osten-
sible execution, of the trusts over it depends on how closely those creating the trust
wish to mimic the effects of an agent’s actual and ostensible authority to his or her
principal to an obligation, and thereby commit the principal’s assets to use in the
discharge of that obligation.
11-04-2008 FA
“Richard” — 2008/4/11 — 17:00 — page 257 — #13








Some Particular and Some General Reflections on Trustee Contracts 257
of administering the Trust Fund (or any part or parts of it), or (b) an obligation
imposed by law on the Trustees in connection with the administration of the
Trust Fund (or any part or parts of it) and (c) in either case is not in respect of
a claim for breach of any obligation owed to beneficiaries under or pursuant
to this instrument.”39
The technique employed here is to limit the rights of the beneficiaries—
the last of the techniques examined in the previous section. This technique
is used, rather than some version of overreaching, as the object of the
exercise is to give certain execution creditors of the trustees automatic
priority of recourse to assets held by the trustees, ahead of any rights in
those assets arising under the terms of trust itself, rather than a prior-
ity dependent on some positive act—some exercise of a power—by the
trustees.
Of course, it would have been logically and doctrinally possible for a
court of equity to infer such an ordering of priorities as between bene-
ficiaries and judgment creditors seeking to enforce their judgment debt
through a writ of fieri facias. The courts might have done this on the basis
that it formed a natural implication from the trustees’ powers to engage
in the transactions which found the judgment debt. Nevertheless, the
courts did not take this path. While that is an interesting historical fact,
and also raises some interesting questions about the economic efficiency
of the default terms which the courts did imply into trusts (giving the
beneficiaries priority over the judgment creditors), it does not alter the
crucial fact for present purposes: the better view is that the courts’ rule
is a default rule of priority, which the parties who create a trust can alter
so as to subordinate interests of beneficiaries under the trust to the rights
of execution creditors.
Other Mechanisms of Enforcing a Judgment Debt
Before addressing the broader implications of this discussion, of which
there are several, it is useful to look at other methods of enforcing judg-
ments against trustees, to see whether they too can be used to allow
direct recourse to trust assets in satisfaction of the trustees’ obligations
which arose in the course of administering the trust. These methods
comprise charging orders, third party debt orders (the name currently
used in England for what were formerly known as “garnishee orders”,
before the advent of the Civil Procedure Rules) and the appointment of a
receiver.
39 This text is by way of example only for the purposes of argument. It is not, and
should not be used as, a precedent.
11-04-2008 FA
“Richard” — 2008/4/11 — 17:00 — page 258 — #14








10th Singapore Conferences on International Business Law:
258 The Regulation of Wealth Management
CHARGING ORDERS
In their modern form, charging orders were established by the Charging
Orders Act 1979.40 Orders under that Act impose a charge over certain
nominated assets of a judgment debtor in favour of the judgment creditor
as security for discharge of the judgment debt. If the debt is not paid,
the assets can be realised and the proceeds of sale used to discharge the
debt.41
The procedure for granting a charging order is regulated by Part 73
of the Civil Procedure Rules,42 as supplemented by its accompanying
practice direction. Such an order can be imposed over land in England
and Wales, UK government stock, corporate securities (other than the
stock of a building society) issued by a body incorporated in England
and Wales, other corporate securities registered in a register held within
England and Wales, units in a unit trust if the register of unit holders is
kept in England and Wales, and funds in court.43
Section 2(1) of the 1979 Act specifically allows for the imposition of
a charging order over “any interest held by a person as trustee of a trust”,
if the interest is in one of the assets within the scope of the Act, or else
is itself an interest under another trust, and “the judgment or order in
respect of which a charge is to be imposed was made against that person
as trustee of the trust”. It is immediately apparent, therefore, that the
obligations of a trustee incurred in the administration of a trust can be
enforced by way of a charging order. Nothing more need be said, other
than noting that a court can only impose a charging order over a limited
range of assets.
THIRD PARTY DEBT ORDERS
A third party debt order, formerly called a garnishee order, is an order
of the court directing someone (usually a bank) who owes money to
the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor instead. That way, the
judgment is satisfied; and in addition, the debtor’s (the bank’s) original
obligation to pay the judgment debtor is extinguished.44 These orders
have a long history.45 Choses in action could be taken in execution under
the Judgments Acts 1838 and 1840, and the procedure is now established
40 See note 20, supra, as regards the genesis of charging orders.
41 See, generally, Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 10, §§303-320.
42 SI 1998/3132 as amended, made under authority of the Civil Procedure Act 1997.
43 Charging Orders Act 1979, ss. 2(2) and 6.
44 See, generally, Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 10, §§251-271.
45 See generally Société Eram Shipping Company Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Ltd. [2003] UKHL 30, [2004] 1 A.C. 260, particularly at
[10]-[15], per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
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and governed by Part 72 of the Civil Procedure Rules,46 together with
its accompanying practice direction. Where does that history leave the
question of whether a debt due to trustees in their capacity as such can be
seized by means of a third party debt order to satisfy a judgment against
the trustees in the same capacity?
There is no authority equivalent to Jennings v. Mather,47 limiting the
issue of a third party debt order to debts owed to a trustee personally. Nor
is there any such limitation in Part 72 of the Civil Procedure Rules or its
accompanying practice direction. The natural course in the circumstances
would therefore be to proceed by way of analogy. So it is quite possible
that a court would not allow a judgment creditor of the trustees to seize
a debt owed to them even though the judgment creditor’s claim arose
out of a transaction with the trustees in their capacity as such. But even
if that were the case, by equal analogy the question should turn on the
priority of claims on the debt, as between the judgment creditor and the
beneficiaries of the relevant trust. And priorities can be adjusted, as noted
earlier.48
APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER
The final mechanism of enforcement to be considered is the appointment
of a receiver. A receiver will take possession of the judgment debtor’s
property (or some specified part of it) in order to generate income which
will be used to pay off the judgment debt. A receiver is very commonly
given powers of sale as well, so that he can also sell the property in
question and use the proceeds to pay off the judgment debt.49
The jurisdiction of the High Court to appoint a receiver to execute a
judgment, though of ancient origin,50 is presently contained in section 37
of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The High Court may by order appoint a
receiver in all cases where it appears to the court to be just and convenient
to do so. Any such order may be made unconditionally or on such terms
and conditions as the court thinks just. The court’s jurisdiction to appoint
a receiver in execution of a judgment is not now confined to those cases
where the Court of Chancery would have done so before the Judicature
Acts.51
The jurisdiction of the court is therefore surely wide enough to allow
a receiver to take possession of, and where authorised to sell, assets held
46 SI 1998/3132 as amended.
47 Supra note 11.
48 See note 15, supra.
49 See, generally, Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 10, §§332-346.
50 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra note 10, §§332-334.
51 Soinco SACI v. Novokuznetsk Aluminium Plant [1998] Q.B. 406, not following
earlier authority.
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on trust in satisfaction of an obligation validly incurred by the trustees
of that trust in their capacity as such. What a claimant would have to
show is that it would be just and convenient for the court to make such an
order. There do not appear to be any cases which indicate whether, and
if so when, a court would make such an order. Still, the court might well
appoint a receiver in such circumstances, even where the terms of the
trust make no provision in that regard, precisely because the problems of
enforcement through a writ of fieri facias, noted earlier, would render it
just and convenient to order the appointment of a receiver. A fortiori, if
the trust in question specifically provided that beneficial interests under
the trust were to be subordinated to the execution of judgments against its
trustees in their capacity as such, and it was otherwise just and convenient
for a receiver to execute such judgment, then the court certainly could
make the requisite order appointing the receiver; and it should do so.
Summary
So far, this paper has addressed the four most important means of execut-
ing a judgment debt owed by trustees in their capacity as such: a writ of
fieri facias, a charging order, a third part debt order and the appointment
of a receiver. Problems or uncertainties exist in relation to all of them.
These problems could undoubtedly be resolved by legislation. However,
it is very strongly arguable that self-help, by those who set up trusts,
could very substantially ameliorate or even resolve those problems and
uncertainties. That self-help would take the form of a provision in the rel-
evant trust instrument which subordinated beneficial interests under the
trust to the execution of judgments against its trustees in their capacity
as such.
This form of self-help is quite distinct from another which has been
proposed, namely widening and reinforcing the trustees’ right of indem-
nity against the trust assets, to which judgment creditors of the trust
might be subrogated in an appropriate case.52 There is no reason at all
why both methods of self-help should not be used and complement each
other; but the aim of the self-help proposed in this paper is to enable judg-
ment creditors to enjoy direct rights against trust assets in suitable cases,
rather than to become involved in the difficulties surrounding trustees’
rights of indemnity.53
52 Tjio, “Lending to a Trust”, supra note 2.
53 Ibid.
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Implications
Various theoretical and practical implications flow from the foregoing
survey of techniques to manipulate the effect of equitable proprietary
rights under a trust. They break down into five broad categories.
THE NATURE OF EQUITABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS
UNDER A TRUST
The first such implication is that equitable property rights under a trust
should not be seen or treated as some uniform or unitary species of inter-
est. It is manifestly obvious that beneficiaries’ positive claims to benefit
under a trust should not, and indeed cannot, be treated as uniform in
their nature and incidents.54 The same is true, however, of the “negative”
property rights generated by a trust, that is, the rights of beneficiaries to
exclude non-beneficiaries from access to trust assets. Equitable property
rights under a trust are not uniform in their effect on third parties: their
effect on third parties can be moulded to a very significant degree.55 Of
course, the extent to which people can modify the prima facie incidents
of equitable property rights is constrained by the very doctrinal nature of
trusts in English law, namely that trusts involve more than just the per-
sonal claims of beneficiaries against trustees56: so, for example, it would
simply be self-contradictory, within the axioms of English law, to deny a
trust any effect on a third party, because trusts, by definition, involve the
beneficiaries having claims to exclude others from trust assets. Still, such
constraints clearly do not limit very greatly the extent to which parties
can modify equitable property rights under a trust, as witness the law
and practice reviewed earlier.
The notion of what amounts to equitable property rights under a trust
is therefore flexible and is itself responsive to the bargain or undertak-
ing on which a particular trust is founded. Equity gives further effect to
a settlor’s intention than the settlor could ever practically replicate by
agreement: equity creates property rights out of the settlor’s intention to
create a trust, assuming that intention is effectually realised. But equity
does not contradict the intentions of the settlor: it gives proprietary effect
to his or her intentions to the extent they ordain. The settlor’s intentions
are ascertained from all the terms used to establish a trust or settlement,
54 See, generally, Nolan, “Equitable Property” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 232.
55 See, generally, Nolan, “Understanding the Limits of Equitable Property”, supra
note 23.
56 Underhill & Hayton, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, supra note 9, §§1.1-1.10. See
also Nolan, “Equitable Property”, supra note 54, and “Understanding the Limits of
Equitable Property”, supra note 23.
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including administrative powers, exemption clauses, limitations of lia-
bility and other managerial provisions such as those examined earlier.
These powers and provisions are all too often dismissed as “boiler plate
clauses” and ignored; but they are vital to understanding and ascertain-
ing what rights, powers, immunities and interests have been brought into
being by a trust or settlement. They have fundamental theoretical signif-
icance, as well as crucial practical consequences for the execution and
management of a trust or settlement.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
This first implication of techniques to manipulate equitable proprietary
rights under a trust leads naturally to the second. An awareness of the
great flexibility of equitable property rights under a trust serves to enrich
our general understanding of proprietary rights. Equitable interests under
a trust are acknowledged to have a proprietary aspect, even where the
proprietary aspect of such interests has been limited and moulded. These
less-than-absolute equitable proprietary rights, in their turn, can shed
light on the notions of “property” and “proprietary rights” as they are
understood in English law (and similar systems). Property rights as gen-
eral concepts of English law, rather than as notions specifically defined
for specific (often statutory) purposes,57 are flexible and malleable:
they do not necessarily have the absolute character of dominium; and
they do not necessarily imply the ability to exclude all the world, or
even all the world apart from a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice.
“[W]ithin a system founded on judicial precedent, establishing the current
meaning of juridical concepts is necessarily an inductive, rather than deduc-
tive, process. The meaning so ascertained can then itself be used in, and
modified by, subsequent cases in a continuing process of iteration; and
categorisation is therefore necessarily provisional, rather than a matter of
applying rigid definitions or a priori concepts.”58
A proper awareness of such matters is absolutely vital when seeking
to understand the English legal system, or a similar system, as well as
when making comparisons with concepts derived from another, radically
different system.59
57 Nolan, “Equitable Property”, supra note 54, at 255-256.
58 Ibid., at 234.
59 See, for example, the stipulation that property shall be absolute in its nature in the
French Civil Code (§544); though even that stipulation is now subject to the new
(2007) provisions concerning La Fiducie (ibid., §§2011-2031).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS
IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
The next implication concerns legal development, and the primary impor-
tance of transactional lawyers in that development. Transactional lawyers
deal with vastly more relevant cases through which juridical structures
such as trusts are created or refined than do lawyers and policy-makers
in the public sector. Transactional lawyers also deal with each case in
much greater detail, and with far greater intensity and frequency, than
Parliament—or any regulator—possibly could: there are far more trans-
actional lawyers, who collectively (and sometimes individually) possess
far greater resources (in terms of time, finance and information) than
those dealing with trust structures in the public sector. Transactional
lawyers also spread their expertise swiftly, so that evolution of new forms
is fast and vigorous. This is partly because the relevant specialist lawyers
operate mostly within a concentrated, interconnected community, where
new developments can spread quickly and easily. The legal profession
in the City of London is a classic example of this phenomenon. It is also
partly because the results of these lawyers’ work—trust instruments—
are disseminated informally as lawyers move from firm to firm, or more
formally through the advice given by barristers to different firms, or else
through books of precedents.60
One recent example of such development in the context of trust law is
the emergence of the very widely drawn discretionary settlement. Case
law, culminating in some decisions of the early 1970’s, laid down certain
principles about the degree of certainty with which a trust instrument
must specify its discretionary objects (i.e., beneficiaries).61 The cases
laid down mandatory rules, not just default rules, which could be rather
restrictive of what settlors wished to achieve. The professionals who
drafted trust instruments on behalf of their clients did not demand law
reform from the courts, or from Parliament. Instead, they set about
mitigating the effects of the rule by drafting intermediate powers of
appointment (i.e., a power to appoint to anyone in the world with the
exception of certain named persons),62 and powers to add to a class
of discretionary objects.63 This continued to the point where, bringing
matters full circle, the courts themselves have acknowledged that the
original mandatory rules have been rendered functionally irrelevant by
60 See Nolan, “Property in a Fund”, supra note 30.
61 Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trusts [1970] A.C. 508; McPhail v. Doulton [1971]
A.C. 424; Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No. 2) [1973] Ch. 9.
62 Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202.
63 Blausten v. I.R.C. [1972] Ch. 256; Re Manisty’s Settlement [1974] Ch. 17.
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careful drafting.64 Lawyers must nowadays know the rules, but only in
order to draft around them successfully.65 The rules are a reef marked
on a chart, acknowledged only to be avoided.
All this adds up to the very vigorous evolution of trust structures
through the frequent interaction of private parties and the rather less
frequent interactions of those parties with the state, manifested in the
courts and Parliament. This system for creating and developing the inter-
nal structures of companies acknowledges that law, and the arrangements
made pursuant to law, are necessarily provisional, and will need to evolve,
because law, and the arrangements made pursuant to it, are founded on
bounded information and rationality deployed in an ever changing con-
text. In other words, the system rests on pragmatic, rather than idealistic,
assumptions about the process of forming legal structures. (The question
of how the goals of the law are, and should be, set is another matter,
demanding informed legal, economic and social policy debate.) Conse-
quently, the system allows for trial—and error. It demands a minimum
acceptance of risk—that there may be undesirable results. This, however,
is what exposes it to its critics.
It is always easy to highlight the risk of harm, and to use such risk
as an argument against any particular course of action. It is much more
difficult to acknowledge such risk and yet still advocate the action, even
following an honest, careful attempt at a risk/benefit calculation (or, more
accurately, a risk/benefit estimation) which gives reasonable grounds for
predicting that any harm will be outweighed by good. The problem is
the fear of risk itself. Correspondingly, when something undesirable has
happened, it is seductively easy to blame those who took the risk of
that consequence. In turn, fear of blame becomes another reason not to
take a risk in the first place. Again, it is much more difficult to show
that the risk-averse course of action could well have produced worse
results. Conversely, if risk is allowed, with desirable consequences, those
who took the risks, rather than those who allowed them, are likely to
get the credit. In short, advocating any system which allows risk has
asymmetrical advantages and disadvantages to the advocate of risk: it is
hard to argue in favour of risk. Yet would modern trust law or corporate
64 Schmidt v. Rosewood Trust Ltd. [2003] U.K.P.C. 26, [2003] 2 A.C. 709 at [34]-[35],
per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe.
65 Of course, the techniques to avoid the rules do reverse the effect of those rules abso-
lutely precisely. For example, it is marginally more difficult to review the discretion
of a trustee empowered to add anyone in the world to a class of beneficiaries, who
is told nevertheless by a non-binding letter of wishes to add the settlor’s “friends”
to the class, than it is to say that a trustee empowered to appoint trust funds to
“friends” has abused his discretion. The non-binding nature of the letter of wishes
and its consequent evidential status as evidence of the purposes for which powers
can be lawfully exercised accounts for the difference.
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law (let alone contract law) exist if such an aversion to risk had always
governed the law? It is highly unlikely. Risk is the inescapable cost of
innovation.
The history of English commercial law, in its broadest sense, pro-
vides some useful guidance for the future development of trust law:
how to accept risk as the price of innovation, but nevertheless manage
and mitigate it. Much of modern commercial law, for example, devel-
oped as the courts accepted commercial practice. Specific problems were
addressed individually and were resolved through litigation, and, much
more rarely, through specific legislative intervention. Only later did Par-
liament attempt to codify, restate or significantly amend these bodies of
law.66 To put the point in more general terms, there was first an accep-
tance of innovation, and an acceptance of trial and error. Only later, once
a significant corpus of law, practice and experience had built up, did
Parliament intervene in any systematic fashion.
More generally still, the point is that inductive, minimally cate-
gorising, “bottom up” methods of rule-making were used in the earlier
stages of developing a system, when understanding of the system was
sketchy; and deductive, generally categorising, “top down” methods
were used once a significant body of knowledge had accumulated to
form the premises in this process of reasoning.67 There is much to com-
mend such an approach: it takes account of the varying—let it be hoped
expanding—boundaries of knowledge; it accepts that hasty intervention,
in the absence of adequate knowledge and experience, can stifle inno-
vation and even be counterproductive; but it accepts also that there is a
very useful role for legislation and regulation—in clarifying the law and
dealing in a principled fashion with the problems revealed by experience,
rather than by conjecture, however well informed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GENERAL LAW
This approach to the generation of law can be usefully applied to the prob-
lems addressed in this paper regarding trustees’ contracts. Practice can
show the way; then the courts, and Parliament, can adopt (and modify)
where they see fit what has been tried and tested in practice.
So, if those who create business or trading trusts wish to assuage the
potential creditors of their trustees, then they can include provisions in
the relevant trust instrument, such as that suggested above, to provide that
creditors of the trustees can levy execution on assets held by the trustees
as part of the trust fund, notwithstanding the beneficiaries’ interests. Of
66 See, generally, Goode, Commercial Law, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin, 2004).
67 As regards the different types of rule, see Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
OUP, 1994,) at 124-136.
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course, that is not, and cannot be, a universal solution for creditors,
because some trusts will not include such a provision. But that does not
exhaust the relevance of the analysis in this paper.
In the first place, a court could imply such a provision—that is, a court
could itself legitimately manipulate the priorities of claims on trust assets,
as it did in Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea, if the facts warranted such a
course of action. That might seem odd. At present, the cases very clearly
indicate that the courts will prefer the claims of beneficiaries on trust
assets over those of creditors seeking to levy execution on those assets
in respect of debts owed by trustees as a result of their administration of
that trust. Nevertheless, if the central argument of this paper is correct,
namely that such a conflict between beneficiaries and creditors essentially
involves a question of priorities, then it is open to the courts to adjust those
priorities where the facts warrant it. The courts certainly could conclude
that a trust which is established for the very purpose of trading, rather
than trading incidentally in the course of administering an estate that
happened fortuitously to include a business, should implicitly involve
such an adjustment of priorities. Indeed, principles of estoppel might
lead to the same conclusion if the beneficiaries of the trust were also its
settlors, and had led creditors to expect recourse to trust assets employed
in the business. In short, there is no absolute rule in the way of such
conclusions. Admittedly, it will very likely be difficult to persuade a
court to depart from the “normal” result in any such competition between
beneficiaries and creditors. Difficult, perhaps, but not impossible. There
is no absolute rule of priorities set by precedent: rules of priority are,
under well established law, much more sensitive to facts than that.68
The analysis in this paper could also have general legal significance in
another way, this time depending on Parliament.69 There is no doubt that
appropriate, well tailored and timely legislation can assist the develop-
ment of trust law and remove uncertainties in the law. Most provisions of
successive Trustee Acts have their substantive origins in practice: useful
terms of trust instruments are incorporated into statute as (usually default)
rules of law.70 Other well known techniques of trust administration, such
68 See note 15, supra.
69 The issues raised in this paper, namely the rights of creditors against trustees and trust
funds, now forms part of the 9th Programme of Law Reform to be addressed by the
Law Commission for England and Wales: The Law Commission Ninth Programme
of Law Reform Law Com No. 293 (London: TSO, 2005), §§2.36-2.40.
70 See, generally, Trustees’ Powers and Duties Consultation Paper No. 146 (London:
Law Commission, 1997), §1.5. The Trustee Act 2000 was the product both of com-
mon practice and a thorough-going project of law reform by the Law Commissions
for England and Wales and for Scotland: ibid. and Trustees’ Powers and Duties
Law Com No. 260, Scot Law Com No. 172 (London: Law Commission, 1999).
The development of trustees’ powers of investment is very usefully explored by
continued on next page
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as overreaching, were developed in legal practice before being set to use
by statute.71 This practice could be adopted in the present context: reform
would work with the grain of trust law. Statute could provide a default, or
even a mandatory, provision along the lines of the clause suggested ear-
lier for inclusion in a trust deed to privilege creditors over beneficiaries.
And when reform works within established, well understood principles,
it is less likely to generate any nasty surprises.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
As well as its immediate practical relevance, the points raised in this
paper have a wider significance for legal education. For a property lawyer
in the common law world, the importance of understanding how trusts
work, and how they evolve, cannot be overstated. The importance is
both functional and theoretical. A knowledge of how trusts work, how
the basic concepts of trust law can be and often are manipulated, and
how trust law evolves, is crucial to understanding modern techniques
of asset management in the common law world.72 Such a knowledge
is also crucial to understanding notions of property, both in common
law jurisdictions and more widely. It throws important light on legal
change and legal evolution. Indeed, if, as has been suggested earlier,
the impact of transactional lawyers on the law is vitally important, and
generally beneficial, it is surely important to educate those who will
become lawyers about these perspectives on the law of trusts. London, at
the very least, would be much the poorer if the lawyers practising there
were to become ignorant of them. A proper understanding of rights is vital
to a legal education; but so too is a proper understanding of institutions.
It is well past time to restore the study and understanding of how trusts
work, and how they are manipulated, to a much more prominent place
in the law school.
It is astonishing, therefore, that law courses in England at least so very
often pay such little attention to these aspects of the law of trusts, leaving
them to be discovered later by trial and error in practice. Courses agonise
over the precise circumstances in which a constructive or resulting trust
arises; over how such trusts are categorised, and over questions such
whether a trust for “my old friends” could ever be conceptually certain.
Students can easily graduate, having passed an Equity or Trusts paper,
with a sketchy notion, at best, of core concepts within the law of trusts
Dr Chantal Stebbings in chapter five of her book, The Private Trustee in Victorian
England (Cambridge: C.U.P., 2002).
71 See, generally, Harpum, “Overreaching”, supra note 24.
72 Nolan, “Property in a Fund”, supra note 30; Langbein, “The Secret Life of the
Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce” (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 165.
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and, crucially, key techniques used by trust lawyers over the years: it is all
too easy for students to survive a law course with little, if any, awareness
of how these concepts and techniques relate to each other and have been
put to use in many diverse contexts. In consequence, law students can
easily come to think that the marginal is central, and treat the trivial as
vital. It would hardly be surprising if, having such a view of equity and
trusts, they took a very dim view of the whole subject.
Young lawyers are therefore often ill-prepared for a professional and
juridical world in which trusts figure prominently. Their education often
leaves them with little appreciation for what Maitland described as “an
‘institute’ of great elasticity and generality, as elastic, as general as
contract” and “the most distinctive achievement of English lawyers”.73
Instead, it commonly leaves them either with an impression that trusts
are insignificant or with the idea that trusts, in so far as they are signif-
icant, essentially constitute a judicial response to unanticipated events
and misfortunes. It gives them very little idea of trusts as one of the vital
functional tools for asset partitioning and asset management in common
law jurisdictions.74
Furthermore, while legal practice is vitally important to an economy
such as London’s, the critique of legal education in this section is not
purely functional, seeking to prioritise the needs of legal practice over all
others. A thorough understanding of positive law is a necessary prerequi-
site of any informed theoretical understanding or normative assessment.
How can theories of “property” be informative or useful if their analyt-
ical foundations are weak? How can any normative assessment of the
uses and functions of trusts be valuable if it is based on ignorance of
what trusts can do and how they do it? A lack of knowledge and under-
standing will leave law students—or, indeed, anyone else—unequipped
to address theoretical and normative questions for themselves. Unless
students have their own knowledge and understanding of a subject, the
only thing they can do is to parrot other people’s views of it. Ill-informed
and unreflective repetition is surely not the object of studying law.
Similarly, an understanding of juridical institutions, the ends to which
they are put and the means by which such ends are achieved is just vital
to understanding law through the prism of economic theory. Unless a
commentator understands both a juridical structure and the means by
which it is put to use, how can he or she usefully identify or evaluate
the efficiency of the legal rules in question. Once again, ill-informed
speculation is no substitute for knowledge and understanding.
73 Maitland, Lectures on Equity (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1929), at 23.
74 See, e.g., Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts”, supra note 72;
Hansmann & Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative and Economic
Analysis” (1998) 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 434.
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Conclusion
This paper began with a very specific problem of trust law, and then
looked to find a solution. The problem is that a creditor cannot eas-
ily reach trust assets to satisfy any claims he may have against trustees
incurred in the administration or purported administration of a trust: gen-
erally speaking, the creditor must enforce his rights against the trustees,
who in turn may in some circumstances look to the trust assets by way of
indemnity. As so often, self-help can be the way forward. The trust can
provide for the creditor’s rights in executing his judgment to have priority
over any countervailing claim of the beneficiaries under the trust. But a
proper appreciation of such self-help has much broader consequences: it
has significant implications for understanding, and teaching, the law.
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